How Georgia Could Boost American Interests
Tedo Japaridze /
My small country of Georgia lies at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. It also lies at the intersection of many of America’s most vital interests in this increasingly important region.
Georgia is connected by geography to the Black Sea and to the West’s NATO allies that border it. Georgia shares another important border with Azerbaijan, with whom it has a strategic alliance, and also with Turkey, which is a member of that alliance.
Georgia also shares a border with Russia, significantly with Chechnya and Dagestan, which means that we stand as an essential barrier to the flow of foreign jihadists from Russia to the Middle East’s many conflicts. Georgians have decided that their destiny is in Europe and the transatlantic community, with an especially strong strategic anchor in the United States.
Russia occupies 20 percent of Georgia’s territory, which it took by force in 2008, just a few years before it seized large parts of Ukraine.
Since 2003, and accelerated after 2012 with the election of the Georgian Dream, Georgia has taken large steps to prove and strengthen its commitment to the West. Georgia is a member of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership, an effort to encourage economic participation in Europe by non-EU member states.
In 2016, we signed an association agreement with the EU, and just recently, in September 2016, a European Parliament committee voted to put Georgia’s application for visa-free travel in Europe high on the EU’s agenda. Each of these achievements is a step toward full membership in Europe.
Georgia has also sought NATO membership for close to a decade. Georgians have shown their mettle and their value fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with American and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We volunteered to do this. I suspect few Americans know that Georgia’s contribution of fighting personnel to NATO’s operations in these conflicts, measured per capita, was greater than any other participant—including all full NATO members—except the United States.
We committed to these coalitions because we believe in the values they defend. Our soldiers have paid a dear price for this commitment, with more than 30 killed and 300 wounded. Georgia defends Europe because Georgia is Europe.
For Georgia, Russia remains a constant, and often menacing, issue. Russia occupies 20 percent of Georgia’s territory, which it took by force in 2008, just a few years before it seized large parts of Ukraine. Obviously, Georgians want their sovereign territory back. They can be forgiven for wondering why Russia does not assume that a stable and prosperous Georgia is the best possible option for Russia’s own stability and prosperity.
By the same token, our friends in Europe and the United States would be better served by not filtering their understanding of Georgia through old-school strategic filters. We all grasp that Russia is a reality, and that we must deal with this reality constructively.
But for the United States and Europe, Georgia today is not just about Russia. We are no longer part of a single Russian periphery, with all roads leading back to Moscow. To the contrary, Georgia has relations in all directions, nearly all of them good and friendly, and we work daily to improve these relations.
Turkey is in transition. Georgia is Turkey’s neighbor and longtime friend. We cooperate on many things, including safeguarding a significant part of Eurasia’s energy exports to Europe. Iran is emerging after many decades of isolation. Georgia knows Iran, and our relations are proper.
The New Silk Road, which will connect Europe to Asia via overland transport and modern communications, will use Georgia’s ports to enter and leave Eurasia. Not surprisingly, China and Georgia have developed a strong, friendly relationship that promises to benefit both countries, as well as all of the countries that profit from the vast new trading opportunities the Silk Road offers.
But for the United States and Europe, Georgia today is not just about Russia. We are no longer part of a single Russian periphery, with all roads leading back to Moscow.
If you search for Georgia through cloudy Cold War vintage optics, you probably won’t find it, and if you do, it is unlikely to be the Georgia increasingly so much a part of Europe and the transatlantic community.
Like the United States, Georgia has just embarked on its election season. We are very proud of this. Georgia ranks by almost every measure as the most democratic state in its region, no small achievement in a land where the heavy Soviet residue hangs over so much. Our press is free, our democracy vibrant and fair, and our free market economy is ranked among the best in the world as friendly to business and investment.
The government’s achievements are impressive, including health care initiatives that now cover the entire population and internet that will soon reach every citizen, no matter how remote. Technology startups are booming, drawing on our legendary high levels of education.
Georgia always had a lot to build on. With freedom blowing strong across our nation, we leave nothing to chance. And we build.
It is our hope that the American elections—which captivate Georgians much like everyone else in the world—will feature the two candidates’ acknowledgment that Georgia will never be relegated to being part of a Russian problem, indeed that it is not a problem at all, but the opposite. Georgia’s capacity to help advance the West’s positive objectives and strategies in and around our region has never been greater, nor the reasons for enlisting Georgian assistance more urgent.
Our performance both at home and abroad argues powerfully that we are up to the task.