Surrender
Peter Huessy /
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in response to a request from a number of Members of Congress, has concluded that the American taxpayers could save $55 billion over the next 10 years by delaying purchase of a new dual-capable conventional and nuclear strategic bomber and simultaneously retiring early—and not replacing—four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
Regrettably, the animating ideas behind the CBO response are more smoke and mirrors than sound policy. Delaying a much needed new strategic conventional bomber simply defers a critical expenditure for a decade, ensuring that a future bomber will cost even more then than it would now after 10 years of inflation have added to its eventual cost.
The CBO also proposes without explanation a dramatic reduction of a U.S. sea-based nuclear deterrent without explaining that such a reduced submarine fleet could not meet U.S. nuclear deterrent needs as established by the President.
Aging Strategic Bomber Force
The need for a new strategic bomber is well established. Delaying the initial funding for the plane by a decade would delay first production until the 2035 time frame. By then, the newest existing B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers will be approaching 75, 50, and 40 years of service-life, respectively. Since building the new replacement bomber will take at least 15 years, the U.S. strategic bomber force would be the oldest ever fielded by the U.S. Air Force.
I doubt our enemies will similarly delay their military modernizations.
Not only are current USAF airframes old (they average 27 years compared with 12 at the height of the hollow military in 1980), they require significant and costly maintenance. They also must use old technologies to meet the new and advanced defense technologies fielded by our adversaries.
For example, some analysts claim we do not need a new bomber that can penetrate enemy defenses because we can launch cruise missiles from well outside the territory of our enemies. Yet using cruise missiles in a conventional conflict to cover 30,000 targets—the number of targets struck in the Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom campaigns—is far too costly compared with using an appropriate level of joint directed attack munitions (JDAMs).
In addition, as senior Air Force commanders have told me, some targets our bombers will need to destroy are mobile and thus require a pilot in the loop flying these new bombers to go after such targets as they move around enemy territory.
Weakening U.S. Nuclear Deterrence
As for the proposed changes to the submarine fleet, the CBO suggestions make even less sense.
The U.S. nuclear deterrent requires that a certain number of nuclear-armed SSBNs—of which the U.S. has 14—to be sufficiently survivable to retaliate against any potential attacker. Yet retiring four additional SSBNs over the next four years, delaying their replacements by four years, and cutting four new Ohio-class replacement submarines would reduce the active fleet at times to as low as six submarines. This means that as few as two would be on station or patrol at any one time, which is half the current submarine-based deterrence.
This means hundreds of Russian or Chinese targets cannot be held at risk.
In addition, a much smaller submarine force has less flexibility, must be moved more often, is more susceptible to attack, and must operate at a greater operations tempo—all of which increase costs while undermining current deterrent policy.
A Misguided Proposal
Not building a dual-capable bomber—the nuclear aspects of the bomber adds 3 percent to its total cost—means that U.S. conventional strategic bombing capability will deteriorate. The U.S. will eventually need to build the new bomber in any case. The CBO proposal would simply defer its acquisition.
Reducing a submarine-based nuclear deterrent by up to one-half would undermine the U.S. deterrent when both Russia and China are modernizing, enhancing, and expanding their nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed platforms and using them as diplomatic and political leverage to further their geostrategic designs.
Some misdirected Members of the Congress apparently think that the United States should weaken its deterrent forces and stand down in the face of Russian and Chinese aggression and nuclear modernization.