Why It Doesn’t Matter Who the Next Secretary of Defense Is
Brian Slattery /
After news of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s resignation Monday, analysts immediately predicted that Hagel will be made a scapegoat for the administration’s poor leadership on issues such as the Islamic State’s rise and the spread of Ebola.
But is that fair? Two of Hagel’s predecessors argue that challenges in implementing sound national security policy have emerged not from the Pentagon, but from the White House.
Last week at the Reagan National Defense Forum, former secretaries of defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates each recalled problems they faced when trying to implement the policies they thought would best provide for the defense of the nation. Both singled out the National Security Council as a particular obstacle.
The NSC is “the president’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters.” It includes administration officials such as the secretaries of defense, state and treasury, but also individuals that the president has authority to appoint at his discretion. This should afford the commander-in-chief the ability to discuss security matters frankly with his staff. However, Obama apparently has overloaded the NSC with personnel who both isolate military leadership from decision making and micromanage how those officials execute their missions.
Gates explained his frustration with the NSC bluntly: “It was that micromanagement that drove me crazy… my concern in terms of this relationship between the White House and the military is not on the big issues…it’s in the increasing desire of the White House to control and manage every aspect of military affairs.” He also commented on how the growing size of the NSC was adding to this complexity: “We have an NSC of at least 350 people; it was 50 when Brent [Scowcroft] and I were there in the [George H.W. Bush] administration.”
Panetta agreed, saying that as secretary of defense he felt left out of the national security decision-making process on a number of occasions: “By the time you get to the White House, the [NSC] staff has already decided or tried to influence what the direction should be. So rather than having a really good give and take, you begin to get sidetracked.”
Gates’ and Panetta’s frustrations indicate that it won’t matter who Obama selects as Hagel’s replacement. Indeed, it was the president, not the secretary of defense or other military official, who pushed for sequestration. It was the president who drew red lines in Syria that he had no intention of backing up. It was the president who clearly stated what he wasn’t willing to do in the fight against Islamic State.
Until the commander-in-chief commits to a legitimate national security strategy, trusts his combat commanders to execute that strategy and advocates for the resources they need to fulfill it, American security will remain in a state of uncertainty–regardless of who is his next secretary of defense.