Burma’s War Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Catch Washington Off Guard
Brent Sadler / Jack Erickson /
As war rages in Europe and as Israel confronts adversaries from all sides in the Middle East, Americans would be forgiven not knowing about the yearslong conflict raging in Burma—the world’s longest-running civil war.
The violence has ravaged the Southeast Asian nation for decades, and battlefield developments indicate the conflict may be reaching a new stage—with consequences for both the region and the United States.
Burma’s long-running civil war cooled during the 2010s, under the democratic government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), but fighting erupted again following a military coup in 2021.
The military, which has always been the most powerful player in Burmese politics, feared a loss of power on the heels of the NLD’s landslide victory in the 2020 elections, and it violently seized control of the government.
Since the coup, Burma’s military junta has imprisoned thousands of anti-junta activists and waged war against Burma’s array of powerful ethnic militias, often killing civilians in the process.
In August, anti-regime militias captured the city of Lashio, threatening the military’s control of Burma’s second-largest city, Mandalay. Anti-regime fighters have also seized key highways that the Burmese military relies on for its vital trade with China.
China has attempted to balance its partnership with the military regime with its support for anti-regime militias near its border. When the Burmese military or junta refused to crackdown on local criminal activity targeting Chinese citizens, Beijing initially supported a counteroffensive by the Three Brotherhood Alliance against the military.
Beijing implicitly greenlit the counteroffensive after rebel groups signaled a willingness to clean up criminal activity. Yet, as the rebels have continued to gain momentum, Beijing now worries that a total collapse of the military government will threaten its broader interests and spell further chaos.
To that end, China has invested billions of dollars in the country, with much of its investment earmarked for strategic infrastructure projects seeking to link China’s southwestern region to the Indian Ocean. These projects are part of the “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor” dating to a 2019 policy plan. in the country, with much of its investment earmarked for strategic infrastructure projects seeking to link China’s southwestern region to the Indian Ocean. These projects are part of the “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor” dating to a 2019 policy plan.
Beijing’s backing has proved crucial to the regime, which has been isolated from most of the world through U.S.-led sanctions in response to its overthrow of the NLD and its brutal crackdown on protesters and ethnic minority groups, such as the highly persecuted Muslim Rohingya.
Chinese leaders hoped to halt the advance of the rebels through a ceasefire deal brokered in January 2024, only for it to collapse six months later.
With the junta seemingly on its heels, China is scrambling to bolster the military’s authority and secure its own assets in the country.
Less than a month after an explosive device damaged a Chinese consulate in Mandalay, Beijing expressed its intent to establish a security firm to more directly secure its personnel and investments in the embattled country.
China has also closed several key border crossings in an apparent attempt to restrict trade and coerce the rebels to halt their offensive.
Beijing’s panic should set off alarms in Washington to prepare for the collapse of the junta and any semblance of stability in Burma. In July, a bipartisan group of senators expressed concern over the Biden administration’s lack of strategy in the country as the situation deteriorated.
Having a pro-China regime in Burma enhances China’s energy security and allows Beijing to operate more freely in the Indian Ocean, including through the construction of a Chinese-funded port in western Burma. The port—which could one day host Chinese naval vessels—would give China a strategic advantage over important partners, such as India and Thailand.
Greater connectivity to the Indian Ocean would also lessen China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait, a critical logistics chokepoint that has long frustrated Chinese strategists. Control of this waterway would effectively cut Beijing off from critical energy resources.
Meanwhile, American policymakers should be facilitating delicate bilateral or multilateral discussions on contingency plans should the junta collapse—notably for evacuating Americans and the regional handling of migrants fleeing the conflict.
Chaos in Sudan should serve as a recent warning of the need to be prepared to evacuate one’s citizens as a country descends into chaos. And the long-running tragedy of the Rohingya refugees serves as a warning of the potential for an even larger exodus that has at times strained neighboring Southeast Asian nations.
Washington must prepare for a post-junta reality and a fractured Burmese landscape fraught with division, which could have negative implications for security in South Asia and Southeast Asia.
At the same time, the United States must be cognizant of expanded Chinese influence in the country. Beijing’s willingness to back a succession of actors—from the democratic government to the junta to the rebels—highlights the importance of Burma to China and its pragmatism in pursuit of its goals in Southeast Asia.
Given the speed of events developing in Burma, the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump could face a chaotic situation that may distract from its priorities in the Indo-Pacific.
As Burma teeters on the brink, it’s important the United States assess its strategic interests in that country and prepare for the worst to ensure America’s interests are preserved.