New York Indictment Highlights China’s Infiltration of State Governments
Michael Cunningham /
On Sept. 3, U.S. federal agents arrested Linda Sun, a former aide of New York Gov. Kathy Hochul and former Gov. Andrew Cuomo, both Democrats, for allegedly acting as an unregistered agent for China. The incident is the latest indication of the lengths Beijing goes to infiltrate state governments and should stand as a warning to governors and state legislatures throughout the country.
The indictment alleges that Sun, who served as deputy chief of staff for Hochul before being fired in March 2023, used her influence to promote the interests of the People’s Republic of China and its ruling Chinese Communist Party in New York.
Her alleged activities included changing official statements on Beijing’s behalf, blocking Taiwanese government representatives from meeting with senior New York officials, arranging for visiting Chinese government delegations to meet with state officials, attempting to arrange a trip to China by a senior New York politician, and “providing unauthorized invitation letters … to facilitate travel by PRC government officials into the United States.”
Sun’s husband, Christopher Hu, who was arrested with her, “facilitated the transfer of millions of dollars in kickbacks for personal gain.” Together, the couple is believed to have made millions of dollars through their scheme, via payments to Hu’s China-based business ventures.
Hochul reportedly terminated Sun and alerted law enforcement immediately after learning of her misconduct but a CCP agent should never have gained access to New York’s Executive Chamber in the first place. There’s no telling how much harm Sun managed to do in the 15 years she worked in the state government. And the problem isn’t unique to New York.
Most state governments are likely unaware of how aggressively Beijing targets them. In fact, subnational influence is such an important part of the CCP’s strategy that at least one Chinese think tank has published reports rating the “friendliness” of U.S. state governors toward China.
This is partly because Beijing sees state and local governments as potential backdoors into a U.S. political system that is harder to infiltrate directly.
While China puts a lot of effort toward influencing and spying on the federal government, it has found that it’s often easier to infiltrate individual states, which tend to have much less stringent security protocols than federal departments and agencies, with their security clearances, rules requiring cleared personnel to report foreign contacts, and close scrutiny by law enforcement agencies like the FBI.
And it’s not just governors they target.
Beijing’s agents seek to cultivate assets at all levels, and they start targeting people early in their careers, when they have little reason to suspect they are on a foreign adversary’s radar. For example, a woman later found to be a Chinese agent managed to form a personal connection with Rep. Eric Swalwell, D-Calif., when he was still on the city council of Dublin, California.
Swalwell reportedly cut ties with the agent after the FBI informed him of her true identity.
In 2022, The Heritage Foundation published a report outlining ways the CCP infiltrates state and local governments and the damaging impacts its activities at these levels have on U.S. national security. The report called on state governments to do more to protect themselves from these malicious actions. While some governors and state legislatures have risen to the occasion, most—including New York—continue to drag their feet, whether out of ignorance, denial, or lack of urgency.
The accusations against Sun and the embarrassment this has caused for Cuomo and Hochul should serve as a wakeup call. Both have expressed outrage at the alleged behavior and sought to downplay their previous connections with Sun. But her actions impaired the performance of both administrations and threatened America’s national security. This should be any governor’s worst nightmare, as it might haunt their legacy regardless of how effectively they dealt with the problem once it came to light.
Prosecution of cases involving espionage and foreign influence operations fall under the responsibility of the FBI, which has made progress in cracking down on these types of activities by Chinese agents. But FBI Director Christopher Wray has previously reported that the bureau opens a new Chinese counterintelligence case every 10 hours. This means it lacks the resources to do much more than engage in an elaborate game of whack-a-mole.
State governments can and should lift part of the FBI’s burden by doing more to prevent these malicious activities from occurring in their jurisdictions. State legislatures can tighten disclosure requirements for state employees, though the effectiveness of doing so would depend on employees’ compliance and states’ ability to enforce the rules. Sun routinely violated state reporting requirements and prohibitions on receiving gifts from “interested sources,” according to the indictment.
Perhaps what is most urgently needed is for state governments to implement more comprehensive background screening for employees whose positions have possible national security implications, such as mid- to senior-level executive and legislative staff.
While states lack the resources to conduct security clearances as robustly as the federal government, they should at least acquire the tools and legal authority, and put procedures in place, to thoroughly vet such personnel for risky foreign ties and to re-vet personnel at regular intervals. Continued failure to increase scrutiny of key personnel doesn’t only pose risks for the states and their leadership, it also threatens national security.