Wheaton College is a private college in the suburbs of Chicago with the following mission statement:

Wheaton College serves Jesus Christ and advances His Kingdom through excellence in liberal arts and graduate programs that educate the whole person to build the church and benefit society worldwide.

When a professor wore a hijab to show solidarity with Muslims and publicly proclaimed it was because Christianity and Islam are similar, Wheaton College placed her on administrative leave.

Should a school like Wheaton College be allowed to suspend or fire a professor for acting contrary to its mission?

Certainly, public colleges are bound by the First Amendment to allow, among other things, personal expressions of religious and political belief by their professors and students. Many private colleges also claim to be non-sectarian and are at least morally bound to live up to that promise: Princeton University, for example (a private institution), repeatedly avows commitment to free expression.

If that school turned around and started prohibiting certain religious expression, such as wearing crosses or supporting Islam (or any other religion, for that matter), it would be operating contrary to its own avowed principles.

But what about Wheaton College? Did it act legally and morally?

Most likely. Wheaton College apparently had no problem with the professor wearing the hijab or expressing solidarity with Islam. The college did, however, have a problem with the professor publicly stating that Islam and Christianity are similar. In justifying its action, the college stated: “[W]e believe there are fundamental differences between [Christianity and Islam].”

Legally mandating that a private college continue to employ someone who the college believes is harming its religious mission would itself raise serious First Amendment problems.

This case bears striking resemblance to the unanimous 2012 Supreme Court case in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC. In that case, the Court held that the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment contain within them a “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination law. And who a “minister” is is not an easy thing to answer.

Given that Wheaton treats its educational mission as itself a religious mission (educate in order to “serve Jesus Christ and advance His Kingdom”), there’s an argument that all professors are ministers at that school. But even beyond this, there’s a strong argument that Justice Thomas makes in concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor that courts shouldn’t be in the business of policing the internal governance of religious organizations at all.

While one might believe there are similarities between the theology of Wheaton College and that of Islam, or while one might believe that teaching college cannot possibly be a “religious” vocation, the point is that, consistent with the First Amendment, these questions should not be adjudicated by a court. These are fundamentally religious questions that the First Amendment leaves up to private organizations.

Ultimately, it appears unlikely that Wheaton College will fully terminate employment of this professor, even though they have every right to do so. This would be a welcome show of tolerance that one would hope we could see the next time a college seeks to terminate an employee for a Christian display.