15 Questions on Iran That Should Be Asked in Senate Hearing

On Thursday morning the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), chaired by Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., will meet to hold its first hearing on the Iran Nuclear Agreement. Appearing before the Committee will be three administration witnesses, including Secretary of State John Kerry, Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew and Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz.

There is a significant level of concern about the Vienna agreement among lawmakers over the deal including verification procedures, research and development, sanctions relief, arms and ballistic missile embargoes and the fate of American hostages, as well as the regional issues that affect allies and partners of the United States.

Here are some of the questions we believe the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should pose to the administrations officials during Thursday’s hearing.

1. Secretary Kerry, the deal with Iran potentially allows Iran to develop and procure nuclear weapon parts, more specifically multiple-point detonation systems and explosive diagnostic systems. What does this provision mean for U.S. nonproliferation policy? Why is Iran given a path to obtain a piece of a nuclear weapon?

2. The agreement says that inspectors’ access “will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities.” What happens if Iran conducts suspicious nuclear-related activities on these sites? Can the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify such activities if Iran says such an inspection would interfere with its military or national security activities?

3. Will the United Nations, the European Union and the United States be required to lift sanctions on Iran if Iran fails to clarify Previous Military Dimensions of its nuclear program? Will the U.N., the EU, and the United States be required to lift sanctions on Iran if the IAEA concludes that Iran has not fully implemented the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues” and has not addressed past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear program as raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65)?

4. Can Iran prevent the IAEA from inspecting its suspicious nuclear sites potentially related to weaponization activities, considering that all IAEA inspections are voluntary on Iran’s part?

5. What courses of action are available to the United States should Iran fail to implement its Additional Protocol in the next 8 years? Would the United States still be obliged to lift nonproliferation, arms and ballistic missile sanctions?

6. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araqchi said that Iran “suppl[ies] arms to anyone and anywhere necessary and will import weapons from anywhere we want and we have clarified this during the negotiations.” Can you quantify an increased risk to U.S. service members given Iran’s continued support for terrorism?

7. The United States is required to lift sanctions on Iranian persons directly associated with terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens and members of the military. These Iranians became a part of the deal without any reciprocity on the part of Iran, which is still holding 4 U.S. hostages: Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati, Jason Rezaian and Robert Levinson. Why was the United States unable to obtain a release of these hostages?

8. Should the Iran deal not be approved by the U.S. Congress, would existing U.N. and regional sanctions remain in place? Would any state or entity intent on conducting prohibited trade with Iran be in a violation with U.N. resolutions and regional sanction laws?

9. U.S. inspectors are not allowed to conduct inspections in Iran. Do you have confidence that other countries will execute their IAEA obligations under the IAEA verification regime faithfully? What steps will the United States take to protect its intelligence methods and sources when required to share information about Iran’s covert activities in the Joint Commission? Why is Iran allowed to have access to such information?

10. Snapback provisions can take weeks to be put in place. With this warning, would Iran have an opportunity to conclude deals regulated under sanctions regime before sanctions “snap back” and implement these deals and obtain resources from them even if the sanctions regime is reimposed?

11. How will the U.S. assist our Middle Eastern allies in defending themselves from ballistic missiles the Iranians will develop after the ban on Iran developing such technology is allowed to expire in eight years? Is the U.S. willing to sell advanced missile defense technology to our allies?

12. President Obama wrote in 2011 that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must go. As a result of this deal, Iran will be better able to increase its support to Assad’s regime. What is the administration’s strategy for overcoming the increased difficulty of unseating Assad?

13.  As a result of this deal, Iran will be able to more strongly project its influence throughout the Middle East, which is likely to lead Sunni-dominated countries to believe that the U.S. is acquiescing to Iranian regional hegemony. The Saudis have already stated they wish to pursue a military nuclear program. What plan does the administration have for avoiding both conventional and nuclear arms races in the Middle East?

14. Russia signed a military cooperation pact with Iran earlier this year. Both countries recently announced a resolution of their feud over an unfulfilled delivery of a sophisticated Russian air defense system to Iran, and Russia in 2011 sold Iran a radar-jamming station. How does the administration know that Russia, in five years, after the ban on conventional weapons is lifted, will not help Iran build an air defense system strong enough to protect its nuclear facilities from an air strike, thereby effectively removing the military option for halting Iranian cheating on the deal and rushing to the bomb?

15. The Houthi uprising in Yemen has forced the U.S. to withdraw its military personnel from the country and allowed al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to grow in strength. AQAP is arguably the greatest al-Qaeda threat to the U.S. homeland. What steps is the administration taking to protect the U.S. now that the nuclear deal will allow Iran to sustain and increase its support for the Houthis, which in turn will allow AQAP to continue growing in strength?

In advance of the hearing, the nuclear agreement with Iran looks to be a risky, limited one that does not end Iran’s nuclear program, much less its ambitions. Iran will remain a nuclear (weapon) threshold state that may actually be better off in achieving nuclear weapon statehood at the end of the deal than it is now due to the lifting of punitive economic sanctions and a reintegration into the international commercial and banking system.

It is important that Congress ensure that this agreement supports the national security interests of the United States, its allies and friends. Otherwise, the agreement should be rejected.